

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD849005

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 13 NOV 1968.
Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980


THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684294

24 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 765th
Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS), Period Ending 31
October 1968

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Aviation School

US Army Missile and Munitions School

US Army Ordnance School

US Army Quartermaster School


US Army Signal School

US Army Southeastern Signal School

US Army Transportation School

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 765TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (AM&S) (GS)
"MUI TEN THANG"
APO 96291

AVGFV

13 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

THRU: Commanding Officer
34th General Support Group (AM&S)
ATTN: AVGF-B
APO 96309

TO: Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
APO 96375

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Organization and Location: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) is organized under MTOE 55-66F, USARPAC 2/67, dated 29 December 1967, as directed by USARPAC GO 131, dated 23 February 1968. Headquarters and Headquarters Company is located at Vung Tau, RVN. Subordinate units of the battalion, with locations, are as follows:

- (1) 56th Transportation Company (ADS), located at Long Thanh North
- (2) 303d Transportation Company (GS), located at Long Thanh North
- (3) 330th Transportation Company (GS), located at Vung Tau
- (4) 388th Transportation Company (ADS), located at Vung Tau
- (5) 611th Transportation Company (ADS), located at Vinh Long

Note: A DS platoon of the 611th is located at Soc Trang and a DS team is located at Can Tho.

(6) Aviation Electronic Support Company, (SOUTH) (Provisional). The Headquarters and 1st Platoon are co-located with the GS and DS units at Vung Tau, the 2nd Platoon is co-located with the 56th (DS) and 303d (GS) at Long Thanh North and the 3rd Platoon is co-located with the 611th (DS) at Vinh Long. Note: See Inclosure 1, Organizational Chart.

FOR OT UT
684294
Inclosure

AVGFV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (A&S) (GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

b. Mission: The primary mission of the headquarters is to provide command, control, staff planning and administrative supervision of the two transportation aircraft general support companies, three transportation aircraft direct support companies and a provisional aviation electronic support company. The principal missions of the subordinate units are as follows:

(1) Direct Support Units: To provide direct support in the areas of airframe, engines, aircraft systems and aircraft armament systems for approximately 1,000 aircraft of all types located in the southern half of the III Corps and the entire IV Corps tactical zones.

(2) General Support Units: To provide general support and back-up direct support maintenance for all aircraft, aircraft components and armament systems supported by the direct support units.

(3) Aviation Electronic Support Company, (S) (Prov): To provide general support and back-up direct support avionics maintenance for over 1,000 aircraft and direct support maintenance for over 600 aircraft. In addition to support for the above aircraft that are organic to aviation units in the support area, the AESC(S) supports army aircraft located in Thailand (JULAG), aircraft operated by Air America in Saigon, and P&E C-7A aircraft located at Wung Tau.

(4) Additional Battalion missions include the following:

a. Operation and control of the Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS), with a present capacity of 200 students in residence.

b. To serve as the primary TARP agency. The battalion control DSU (388th) is located at Wung Tau in position to receive reparables from units throughout Vietnam, move these reparables directly to the depot level shops of the Corpus Christi Bay (FAMF) as well as the battalion GS level shops, receive the serviceable output of these shops and feed the serviceable components back into the supply system.

b. Mission Operations:

(1) All units of the battalion, with the exclusion of the 303d Trans Co (GS), were engaged in Combat Support Operations, with integrated unit and individual training during the entire reporting period.

(2) Unit Movement: See Inclosure 2 for the Operational Report of the 303d Trans Co (GS) relative to deployment from CONUS to RVN.

(3) Aircraft General and Direct Support Maintenance: During this reporting period, the aircraft GS and DS units of this battalion provided support for over 1,000 aircraft located in the III and IV corps tactical

AVCFV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOL-65 (AI)

zones. This support included all installed and float armament systems, repair of battle and crash damage, repair of direct exchange components and repair of TARP items. The following breakdown represents performance data in this mission area:

(a) Aircraft (and item) work orders completed amounted to 535.

(b) Aircraft Components:

| <u>Received</u> | <u>Repaired</u> | <u>NRTS</u> | <u>NRTS Rate</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|
| 3150 | 2401 | 952 | 25.8% |

(c) T-53 Turbine Engines:

| <u>Received</u> | <u>Repaired</u> | <u>NRTS</u> | <u>NRTS Rate</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|
| 141 | 69 | 72 | 51% |

(d) Aircraft Armament Sub-System Components:

| <u>Received</u> | <u>Repaired</u> | <u>NRTS*</u> | <u>NRTS Rate</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|
| 1511 | 1390 | 171 | 11% |

* Note: Subsystem components listed under NRTS column were demilitarized and salvaged locally.

(e) The aircraft GS and LS units expended 262,792 productive man-hours in the mission support reflected above. Of these hours, 121,646 were military and 141,146 were contract civilian.

(4) Avionics General and Direct Support Maintenance: During this reporting period, ASC(S) provided support for an average of 1,078 aircraft of all types. The following data reflect mission workload and performance.

(a) Components Processed:

| <u>Components Received</u> | <u>Repaired</u> | <u>NRTS</u> | <u>NRTS Rate</u> |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|
| 15,423 | 14,499 | 924 | 6% |

(b) Test Sets Processed:

| <u>Test Sets Received</u> | <u>Repaired</u> | <u>NRTS</u> | <u>NRTS Rate</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|
| 356 | 356 | 0 | 0 |

AVGFV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

(c) AESC(S) recorded an expenditure of 26,908 military and 31,664 civilian contract productive manhours, total 58,572, in mission performance.

(5) Aircraft Processing: During this period, the 388th Transportation Company (ADS) off-loaded four carriers at the Vung Tau Port, assembling and processing 99 fixed and rotary wing aircraft for issue.

(6) Aircraft Issues: During the reporting period 84 serviceable aircraft were issued:

| <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| OV-1 | 14 | AH-1G | 55 |
| U-1A | 8 | OH-6A | 3 |
| U-6A | 2 | CH-47 | 1 |
| O-1G | 1 | | |

(7) Retrograde aircraft processed: A total of 27 retrograde aircraft were processed and moved to Saigon for shipment.

| <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| UH-1 | 15 | CH-47 | 1 |
| OH-23 | 5 | U-1A | 2 |
| OH-6A | 3 | OV-1 | 1 |

(8) Aircraft Recovery Operations: During this period the aircraft direct support companies of this battalion rigged 183 aircraft for aerial lift. Of these aircraft, 64 were field extractions, i.e., aerial recovery from an area temporarily secured by ground troops and/or armed helicopters delivering suppressive fire. The remainder, 119 aircraft, were rigged for maintenance evacuation, i.e., airlift of the aircraft from one maintenance facility to a higher echelon facility or to an aerial port for shipment to CCNUS. The 330th Transportation Company (GS) successfully airlifted 106 aircraft in support of the DS companies. For the 330th this marks the end of 25 months of continuous aerial lift support, having compiled a record of 1,013 evacuations, while experiencing no accidents or major incidents.

(9) Flight Operations: This battalion operates a consolidated flight operations under the supervision and control of the S-3. All aviators and aircraft assets of the units stationed at Vung Tau are controlled by the operations section. Unit requirements for passenger and cargo lift are consolidated by the operations section which results in optimum utilization of aircraft assets. The wide dispersion of battalion units, the large area of maintenance support responsibility and the tactical situation which dictate air lift of all passengers and a large percentage

AVGFW

SUBJECT: Operational report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1966, RCS CSFOR-65 (21)

of cargo creates a flight operations workload of unusual proportions for a battalion size command. The following summary of operations for this reporting period is presented as typical of this area of activity. All missions were completed without accident or incident other than one engine failure after which the aircraft was autorotated to a rice paddy without damage.

| <u>PAX Carried</u> | <u>S/Tons Airlifted</u> | <u>Hours Flown</u> | <u>Last Pax No</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 5,285 | 454 | 3,094 | 268,250 |

(10) Technical Supply Operations: The following statistics represent the combined supply activities during this reporting period:

| | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> | <u>October</u> |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|
| ASL Lines | 50,434 | 52,197 | 47,072 |
| Lines at zero balance | 3,986 | 4,317 | 3,929 |
| Requests Received | 27,563 | 20,424 | 24,375 |
| Demand Accomodation | 83% | 62% | 80% |
| Demand Satisfaction | 52% | 55% | 58% |

(11) Theater Aircraft Repairable Program (TARP): The total bulk tonnage of aircraft components processed by this battalion in support of the TARP program during this reporting period is as follows:

| | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> | <u>October</u> |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|
| Total tons received | 117 | 135 | 166 |
| Shipped to COMUS NRTS * | 146 | 186 | 218 |
| Shipped to FAF ** | 19 | 11 | 19 |
| Shipped to 330th (GS) | 20 | 14 | 68 |

* Not repairable this station

** Floating aircraft maintenance facility

(12) Training:

(a) Army Aircraft Refresher Training School (AARTS): The AARTS school, operated by this battalion, provides refresher and new equipment training for personnel throughout RVN. The school, sponsored by the 34th General Support Group, is staffed by 1 officer, 10 enlisted and 17 civilian personnel. During this reporting period, 952 students were graduated from the following courses:

AVGFW

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFCR-65 (RI)

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>TOTAL STUDENTS</u> |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| OH-6A Pilot | 81 |
| OH-6A Airframe | 139 |
| UH-1B,C Airframe | 102 |
| UH-1D,H Airframe | 106 |
| CH-47 Airframe | 63 |
| T53-L11 | 97 |
| T53-L13 | 107 |
| T55 | 62 |
| T63 | 81 |
| Tech Supply | 101 |
| AH-1G Airframe | 13 |

(b) During this reporting period, the Aviation Electronic Support Company (South) has conducted classes, with OJT, on several avionics systems. The need for this program is due to a critical shortage of personnel in-country who are qualified to trouble-shoot and repair the various systems. Forty-eight students from units throughout Vietnam received training on the AN/TPN-18 and AN/TPX-44, components of the AN/TSQ-71/72 ground radar shelter. Twenty-one other students were graduated from courses in GCA and various other equipment. Two EM from the company were graduated from the AN/MC-1 Compass Clairator School at Clark AFB, P.I. These personnel will enable the unit to perform its role as a DS/GS calibration facility for the AN/ASN-13, AN/ASN-62, AN/ASN-76 and J-2 Compass systems.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Lack of Mission Essential Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: At present, the Avionics Electronic Support Company (South) (Prov) has no personnel, nor is it authorized any personnel, to operate the OV-1 peculiar shops that were recently completed at Vung Tau. The SLAR and IR shops are affected by a shortage of test equipment, however these shortages are expected to be filled prior to the end of this calendar year. The camera shop is fully equipped but the lack of personnel in MDS 41G precludes effective maintenance support.

(b) EVALUATION: The company is presently operating with personnel drawn from six RL teams plus attached avionics personnel from the DS/GS aircraft maintenance units of this battalion. The absence of a TOE for the avionics company seriously affects the acquisition of personnel with the required MCS skills. A recommended MTOE has been initiated and forwarded through channels but has not been implemented.

AVGFEV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (II)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a MTOE for the Avionics unit be approved and implemented as soon as possible. Further recommend that civilian contract personnel with specific SLAR and IR skills be employed until such time as qualified military personnel are made available.

(2) Added: See paragraph 1f of inclosure 2.

b. Operations:

(1) Shipment of unserviceable aircraft components not included on the TARP list to the control DSU.

(a) OBSERVATION: The battalion control DSU, 388th Trans Co, continues to receive unserviceable components from other DSUs throughout RVN that are not in the TARP program or should have been otherwise disposed of at point of origin.

(b) EVALUATION: This results in an unjustifiable burden on the in-country transportation system, congests the TARP yard and delays movement of critical components to the GS unit shops, the FANF and to CONUS depots.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all supply and maintenance activities in USARV check the TARP list for each unserviceable component and, when applicable, the support DSU should make shipment directly to the appropriate CONUS depot or other destination as directed by AMMC.

Note: The above item was previously reported but is included in this report for added emphasis.

(2) Use of UH-1H Helicopters for Recovery Operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: When used in the role of a rigging vehicle, the UH-1D has a very marginal power reserve.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the variety of aircraft types and the nature of damage incurred incident to forced or crash landing the rigging teams of DS units must carry equipment on every recovery operation that may not be utilized. This extra weight added to the weight of the flight and rigging crews seriously reduces the D model power reserve. Also noteworthy is the fact that the tactical situation may dictate downwind landings, landing in confined areas and take off over high barriers. Under most operating conditions the UH-1H series can be used as the rigging and lift vehicle for recovery of the OH-13, OH-23, OH-6 and O-1 type aircraft, thus eliminating the need for CH-47 support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That DS units be authorized UH-1H series helicopters in lieu of the UH-D series.

AVGFW

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (J&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(3) Sling Loading AH-1G and UH-1C Helicopters:

(a) OBSERVATION: Some difficulty has been experienced by recovery rigging crews in preparing UH-1C and AH-1G Cobra helicopters for sling loading. This usually involves getting the pitch lowered and then getting enough tension on the main rotor tie-down strap to prevent the front blade from flapping.

(b) EVALUATION: These two models in the Huey series present peculiar problems during the field extraction recoveries. These problems are due primarily to the "door-hinge" 540 rotor system and the dual hydraulic system that accompanies it. The 540 rotor hub and blades allow more flapping action of the blades than previous systems. If not properly secured, this flapping action will allow the front blade strap to loosen. This sometimes leads to the hook of the strap becoming disengaged from the tow ring on the skid. This hook has caused considerable sheet metal damage to the side of the aircraft on these occasions. The rigging crews also have trouble getting the collective pitch lowered due to loss of hydraulic accumulator pressure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When tying down the front blade, have one member of the recovery team loop an extra tie-down strap over the tip of the forward blade and hang from it while two other members of the team jack the blade down. The front and rear blade straps are made from cargo tie-down straps. Both straps should have a section of fire hose slipped over them and sewed to the straps to prevent chafing where the strap is double-looped around the blade. The rear strap should be a fixed length so the jack can be removed and replaced by the plain hook from the front strap. On both the UH-1C and the AH-1G the front blade should be jacked down as far as possible. If accumulator pressure has been lost, the emergency hydraulic system will not lower the collective pitch. In this event, the rigging team can turn the main rotor by hand as down-ward pressure is applied to the collective. All tie-down straps should be safetied with hook closure safety pins, and .040 safety wire. A ribbon type drag chute should also be used to stabilize UH-1C and AH-1G helicopters while being airlifted.

(4) Deletion of Items Coded "M" or "P" on ASL.

(a) OBSERVATION: Items coded "M" or "P" cannot be deleted from the ASL because of the NCR Program 014.

(b) EVALUATION: In running an 014 quarterly review program on the NCR 500 it was noted that items coded "M" or "P" were not deleted after one year with no demands. This was corrected by manually reviewing these items and removing them from the ASL and placing them in fringe files.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That program 014 be modified to correct this deficiency and pending such action, each DSU should screen those items for possible deletion and turn-in.

AVGFW

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (JMS)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) Maintenance of ADP vans.

(a) OBSERVATION: Processor vans in the NCR 500 DSU configuration cannot be operated without an air conditioner to prevent overheating.

(b) EVALUATION: Air conditioning is essential for proper operation in both the processor and work vans. At present, no float air conditioning units are available and support maintenance units do not have an adequate repair capability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That float air conditioners be made available for DX and the responsible tech service maintain repair capability.

(6) Removal of Smoke Grenades from AH-1G Helicopters.

(a) OBSERVATION: Damaged AH-1G helicopters frequently arrive at maintenance facilities and have even been shipped to CONUS with armed smoke grenades in the grenade dispenser.

(b) EVALUATION: It is believed this dangerous practice is due to a lack of knowledge by personnel preparing aircraft for retrograde or movement to maintenance facilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That maintenance officers throughout RVN be advised of this problem.

(7) Armament K-7 Relay.

(a) OBSERVATION: A large percentage of the electronic assemblies from the XM-28 subsystem received at the repair facility are inoperative due to a burned or shorted K-7 relay.

(b) EVALUATION: Unit personnel performing maintenance and repair on the XM-28 subsystem are failing to make certain the wiring has been repositioned correctly. The XM-28 turret makes quick, powerful movements and any wire or cable not securely fastened will be damaged. When the wiring leading to the azimuth resolver is not placed in the grooves provided, they will be crushed when the inspection plate is installed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Replace the 10 ampere circuit breaker with a 3-5 ampere breaker thereby breaking the circuit before serious damage can occur. In addition, using units should make mechanics and inspectors aware of the critical features of the system.

(8) Armament-Shortage of Test Equipment.

AVGFV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (T&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(a) OBSERVATION: Test equipment for some armament subsystems and components is in short supply or non-existent. Trial and error test methods are costly and time consuming but all too frequently the only method available.

(b) EVALUATION: Subsystems such as the XM-21 can be very troublesome when there is hydraulic leak in the pylon and the repairman must use the trial and error method to determine that the fault has been corrected. A test stand for these pylons can easily be constructed in any welding shop. To construct this test stand, a hydraulic power source, two multiarmament mounts, two XM-6 adapters, a control panel and sighting station are required. Production test sets for the TAT-102 and XM-28 subsystems are also in short supply, however, these may also be fabricated from spare parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Interested personnel should contact the Commanding Officer, 330th Transportation Company (GS), APO 96291 for specific details.

(9) Main Drive Shaft Installation, UH-1.

(a) OBSERVATION: A recent incident that occurred at a DS maintenance facility was caused by the inadvertent installation of a main drive shaft in reversed position.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found that drive shaft; P/N 204-040-004 could be installed in either direction whereas shaft P/N 204-040-10 can only be installed correctly. Incorrect installation of the -004 shaft is extremely dangerous due to the likelihood of over-heating, causing the grease to catch fire. It is also possible for the incorrectly installed shaft to shear during flight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this "lesson learned" be brought to the attention of all maintenance personnel.

(10) Consolidated DS/GS Armament Repair Facility

(a) OBSERVATION: A staff study was conducted on the overall operation of a consolidated DS/GS Armament Repair Facility in the 765th Transportation Battalion at Vung Tau Vietnam. Problem areas that were scrutinized were maximum utilization of critical 45J MOS personnel, elimination of duplicate expensive test equipment and a one stop maintenance repair facility for supported customer demands.

(b) EVALUATION: Presently the 765th Transportation Battalion supports some 59 customers who have approximately 700 armament subsystems of 10 different types, ranging from the M-3 to the new XM-28 subsystem. Complete Direct Support - General Support repair service is afforded all armament subsystems, especially those applicable to the UH-1 and AH-1G aircraft.

AVGPFV

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

It should be noted that since the adoption of the consolidated Direct Support General Support Armament repair concept in January of this year, not one system has had to be evacuated to a higher echelon of repair, nor has any system had to be evacuated to CONUS.

Through consolidation of the DS/GS we have one armament repair facility with 21 enlisted personnel, allowing greater flexibility for more efficient utilization of trained repairmen and the reduction of 20 basic and supplemental tool sets plus the elimination of one complete set of test equipment. The dollar savings for the test equipment alone equates to \$92,142.

Within the 765th Transportation Battalion the 330th Transportation Company (GS) has the responsibility to coordinate and program the maintenance effort of the DS/GS armament repair facility, to accomplish all repairs required in order to satisfy customer requirements, and to insure safe operable armament subsystems. The armament repairmen assigned to the 388th Transportation Company (ADS) are under the operational control of the NCOIC of the consolidated armament facility and receive all work tasks from this supervisor as if they were assigned to the General Support Company.

A strict program of quality control and assurance is achieved by utilization of a rigorous in-progress and final inspection technique. All subsystems work ordered to the DS/GS facility are exposed to a complete quality audit regardless of the purpose for which the subsystem is referred to the armament repair facility.

The benefits derived from this consolidated effort are:

- "One-Stop" armament repair for customer aircraft or systems through the General Support echelon of maintenance.

- Cross-training of DS/GS MCS skills through the medium of a pure and continuous on-the-job training situation.

- Elimination of duplicate tooling and test equipment.

- Decrease of aircraft and armament subsystem down-time.

- Elimination of duplicate forms and records maintenance.

- Provides capability for immediate customer response through in-depth MCS skills and test equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That like Transportation Battalions with the basic maintenance responsibility in aircraft armament repair with co-located companies, such as in the 765th Transportation Battalion, adopt a like consolidated DS/GS repair maintenance concept.

AVGF-B (13 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQS, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), APO 96309 15 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. Reference Section 2, a (1) Concur.
2. Reference Section 2, b (1) Concur. This subject is constantly under surveillance by this command to insure rapid turnaround of all unserviceables.
3. Reference Section 2, b (2) Concur. Action has been taken to issue all DSU units UH-1H aircraft as replacements for UH-1D aircraft.
4. Reference Section 2, b (3) Concur. This information will be disseminated to the field in the forthcoming 34th GSG Quarterly Newsletter.
5. Reference Section 2, b (4), the revised program 014 identifies coded "M" and "P" items as "3 CR" and "Hold 417" respectively on the print-out when no demands are recorded. Deletion of the items must be done manually since the machine is not and cannot be programed to perform this action.
6. Concur with recommendation, Section 2, b (5).
7. Reference Section 2, b (6) removal of Smoke Grenades from AH-1G Helicopters. Concur. Further recommend that all maintenance officers be advised as to the removal of the explosive bolts from the wing store hardpoints as well as the subject problem.
8. Reference Section 2, b (7) Armament K-7 Relay: The cause of K-7 relay failures described indicates that using units may be attempting an unauthorized level of maintenance. The XM-28 technical assistance team has not encountered this particular problem. It is usually caused by shorted connectors which are damaged while loading ammunition containers. The suggested change in circuit breakers will be discussed with WECOM as an acceptable practice. A 3-5 ampere circuit breaker still may not protect K-7 relay, as it might also require continual resetting because of other peak currents to which the turret is subjected.
9. Reference Section 2, b (8) Armament - Shortage of Test Equipment: All 34th GSG armament shops have fabricated M-16/21 test stands, which are superior to standard test equipment furnished. Fabrication of

AVGP-B (13 Nov 68) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

similar test rigs for AH-1G armament subsystems is also feasible. However, the task will be more difficult because of the increased complexity of the subsystems. In the case of the XM-28, some of the components required for test equipment fabrication are as scarce as the test equipment. Ten (10) XM-28 Field Test Sets have been issued to DSU's to date. WECOM has been requested to furnish revised availability schedules for the remaining eleven (11) sets, which should satisfy DSU requirements within 34th GSG and divisional units.

10. Reference Section 2, b (9) Main Drive Shaft Installation UH-1. This appears to be the result of flagrant maintenance malpractice. The problem has been known for quite some time and is stressed in all UH-1 ground school courses and maintenance manuals.

11. Reference Section 2, b (10) Consolidated DS/GS Armament Repair Facility: Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN O. NORTHRIDGE
MAJ, TC
Adjutant

AVHGC-DST (13 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S)
(GS) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lack of mission essential personnel, page 6, paragraph 2a(1). A new MTOE has been received for the Avionics Support Company (South)(Prov) as part of a packet from 34th General Support Group (AM&S) and the USARV Aviation Officer. It will be forwarded to higher headquarters upon completion of processing.

b. Reference item concerning shipment of unserviceable aircraft components not included on the TARP list to the control DSU, page 7, paragraph 2b(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur with the recommendation and the comment in 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2.

c. Reference item concerning removal of smoke grenades from AH-1G helicopters, page 9, paragraph 2b(6) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 7: Concur. The 34th General Support Group (AM&S) will publish information in the next Monthly Newsletter concerning removal of smoke grenades and explosive bolts for AH-1G aircraft being evacuated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



A.R. GUENTHER
CPT. AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:

HQ 34th GS Gp (AM&S)

HQ 765th Trans Bn (AM&S) (GS)

GPOP-DT (13 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 765th Trans Bn (AM&S) for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
303d Transportation Company (Acft Maint) (General Support)
765th Transportation Battalion (AMS) (General Support)
APC San Francisco 96530

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 303d Transportation Company (AM) (GS) For Period
Ending 31 October 1968, MCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

Commanding Officer
765th Transportation Battalion (AM) (GS)
ATTN: S3
APC 96291

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities: a. This unit was activated on 21 February 1968, at Fort Benning, GA, per GO#73, headquarters, 3d US Army. This unit PCSD was scheduled to be 1 April 1968, but due to slow personnel and equipment fill the PCSD was postponed. Likewise, because of these shortages of personnel and equipment this unit's ASDD slipped from 11 July 1968 to 10 August 1968, and the PSRD from 31 July 1968 to 15 September 1968. Because of this slow fill in personnel and equipment this unit was required to submit three (3) special readiness reports. On 10-12 Jul 1968, this unit conducted a FTX and on 17-19 Jul 1968, CRT 55-66 was completed. The result rendered by the 10th Aviation Group, Fort Benning, GS, was that this unit was combat ready. On 24 July 1968, the final readiness report submitted indicated the following information to higher headquarters:

- (1) Shortages in personnel strength.
- (2) Shortages of major TOE items which amounted to 14 major end items.
- (3) Shortages in FLL, Shop Stock, Special Tools and Publications.

b. The commanders evaluation indicated that late arrival of major items of TOE equipment would have an adverse effect on this unit's capability to perform its mission at ASDD. It further stated that significant logistical problems existed in shortages of equipment. It further requested that these shortages be made available in-country, i.e., Vietnam, and stated that if not it would drastically effect this unit's capability of performing its in-country aircraft maintenance mission. The report emphasized that 10% of EM had not arrived as of the date of submission of the report. The installation concerned added that based on information available, the unit would be able to perform 80% of its TOE mission capability; that personnel shortages still remain a problem; however, it appears that some in-country assignment would be expected and recommended that this unit deploy as scheduled. On 29 Jul 1968, this unit successfully completed the PCM inspection from the USAIC, Fort Benning, GA. On 26 August 1968, the equipment was shipped by rail to Savannah, GA, then by ISTS vessel to Newport Dock, RVN, arriving on 9 October 1968. The advance party departed CONUS for Vietnam on 3 September 1968, and arrived 6 September 1968. The main body departed CONUS 20 September 1968, and started arriving in-country 21 September 1968. The rear detachment departed CONUS 11 October 1968, and arrived in RVN 12 October 1968. This unit is now located at Long Thanh North, RVN, and is assigned to the 765th Transportation Battalion, Ad 96291.

Inclosure 2

2. COMMANDER'S EVALUATIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

a. PERSONNEL

(1) Fill of personnel prior and after POSD

(a) OBSERVATION: The fill of E7's and above was DA allocated and the E6's and below fill was by DA levy, very slow and did not meet the proposed POSD.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found that because of this slow fill of personnel, this unit could not commence POR training for the majority of TOE authorized personnel and this unit was required to re-cycle the PCR training program continuously throughout the period at Fort Benning, Georgia, due to new arrivals coming as late as the deployment date.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when the POSD is set by DA the authorized personnel should be on station at the proposed POSD.

b. OPERATIONS

(1) OBSERVATION:

This unit moved its entire TOE equipment and personnel from CONUS to Vietnam without loss or serious damage of equipment or personnel.

(2) EVALUATION:

(a) This unit has just recently and successfully moved its total TOE equipment and personnel from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Long Thanh North, Vietnam. The move was smooth and efficient with no loss of any TOE equipment and only minor damage caused to some by MHE at the port of debarkation.

(b) The success of this move was only made possible by meticulous prior preparation. This involved six (6) basic phases:

- (1) Initial Planning Phase
- (2) Preparation of Vehicles and Conex Loading
- (3) Rail Load of Equipment
- (4) Personnel Move
- (5) Discharge of Equipment at POD
- (6) Highway Transport to Final Destination

(c) In the sub-paragraphs that follow, an explanation of each basic phase will be discussed:

(1) The initial planning phase started on 29 March 1968, when the unit submitted ADUM II. In compiling the information necessary for this report the unit loading officer took careful consideration pertaining to the weight, cube of all TOE equipment, special tools, hold baggage and over sized items to determine the number of conex containers and crates that would be necessary to ship this unit's equipment overseas. ADUM II provided valuable information for the actual move.

(2) The second phase was accomplished through the establishment of loading teams consisting of one (1) NCOIC, one (1) licensed fork-lift operator, and eight (8) personnel well instructed in the packing of cargo. This created a continuity throughout the entire second phase. These teams packed each conex, labeled all inserts and made duplicate listings of all inventories placing one (1) copy in the conex and forwarded a second work copy to Consist Clerk who typed the TCM and Consist. This proved invaluable during the unpacking phase because each item could easily be located.

(3) The third phase was virtually under the control of this unit. However, post transportation was responsible for providing rail cars, blocking, tie down devices and MHE. It is recommended from the experience gained by this unit that items and services that are provided by supporting units are made available at the time needed lest serious delay result and unnecessary additional manhours be spent. An intensive training program of personnel selected for rail loading was accomplished by this unit. This resulted in safe and successful completion of this phase.

(4) The personnel move consisted of three (3) sub-phases (a). The Advance Party, (b) The Main Body, and (c) The Rear Detachment. The advance party departed Fort Benning via commercial airline to Travis Air Force Base and then by channel air to the Republic of Vietnam. The main body departed Fort Benning, Georgia, by SAAM air on three (3) flights and the rear detachment also came by SAAM air with another deploying unit. Close coordination in this phase was imperative with post transportation officials. Upon arrival of the Main body the prior planning made by the advance party provided a smooth uninterrupted flow of personnel from Bien Hoa to home base at Long Thanh North.

(5) The phase of discharging equipment at POD required close liaison with the port officials to adequately billet and mess this unit's guards and truck drivers. Guards are necessary to insure possession of property and were also used as a security measure in the final phase. This phase was very time consuming and boring. Therefore, special efforts were taken to motivate the guards with a sense of urgency.

(6) The highway transport phase to final destination proceeded as scheduled and with virtually no problems. This was due to the fine support rendered by the Logistical Support Command. Elements of one motor pool were also on the scene to deprocess and organize the necessary serials for the convoy. Upon arrival at the final destination the conexes, vehicles, vans and crates were positioned where needed with a minimum amount of confusion.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the above "Lessons Learned" relative to deployment programing and execution be disseminated to all concerned.

c. TRAINING: POR TRAINING, SPECIAL TRAINING, ATT AND ORT

(1) OBSERVATION

(a) POR Training had to be re-cycled throughout the unit's stay at Fort Benning, Georgia, to enable new arrivals to complete PCR training prior to deployment.

(b) Special training was made available in the form of AAMTAP and other short courses and MOS producing courses at service schools.

(c) ATT was conducted on 10 - 12 July 1968, and the ORT on 17-19 Jul 1968.

(d) The late arrival of the in-country mission allowed little time to train or procure addition MCS skills.

(2) EVALUATION

(a) The re-cycling of POR training was worthwhile to new arrivals but a waste of man power and time. If POSD requirements are fulfilled, a great saving in training can be realized.

(b) By taking full advantage of special training made available from AAMTAP and other service schools, this unit gained valuable MOS's which were not included in the outdated TOE 55-458E, i.e., OH-6A, CH-47, CH-54, AH-1G, etc.

(c) Advice as to the in-country mission would have enhanced the mission readiness of this unit.

(d) A maintenance mission did not exist for the unit while at Fort Benning, Georgia. Valuable skills could have been developed and training of crews completed if a limited maintenance mission had been assigned.

(3) RECOMMENDATION

(a) That timely personnel fill be made to allow personnel to be available at POSD.

(b) That full advantage be taken of service schools, MCS producing courses, and AAMTAP courses so that units deployed in the future will be able to fulfill their TOE and actual assigned mission.

(c) Recommend that less time be spent on field training for general support maintenance units and that more time be spent on actual repair of aircraft and components so that individuals assigned can gain more experience in their individual maintenance field.

(d) INTELLIGENCE: NONE

(e) LOGISTICS

(1) TOE Property

(a) OBSERVATION: On 8036 at Atlanta Army Depot this unit requisitioned all TOE property. On 8044 all requisitions were cancelled by Atlanta Army Depot because of the relocation of the unit activation site to Fort Benning, Georgia. On 8066 this unit re-requisitioned all TOE equipment again at Fort Benning, Georgia. Considerable delay was experienced in ordering special tools and shop stock due to the late arrival of the unit's future in-country mission based on an aircraft density by make and model.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that 30 days were actually lost in re-ordering the TOE equipment at Fort Benning on 8066. The unit ESRD slipped approximately 30 days due to the shortage of equipment. The late arrival of the in-country mission did not allow sufficient time to order and receive all special tools and shop stock.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That if a similar situation manifests itself again the original requisitioning agency should change the routing instructions to the new location of the unit thereby saving valuable time and man hours. That the mission by make and model arrive during the early stages of activation to allow sufficient time to order special tools and shop stock.

(f) ORGANIZATION

(1) TOE 55-458E:

(a) OBSERVATION: That TOE 55-458E is outdated concerning MOS skills for a unit to accomplish its maintenance mission on the modern Army aircraft.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that TOE 55-458E is lacking in MOS data for personnel to perform General Support maintenance on the U-21, CH-47, AH-1G, CH-6 and CH-54 aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this TOE be updated or modified at DA level to include necessary MOS skills to allow repair on the above listed aircraft.

(g) OTHER

(1) Publications must be ordered upon activation. Accounts must be established with AG Publication Center, Baltimore, Maryland and AG Publication Center, St Louis, Missouri.

(2) The late arrival of the in-country aircraft mission by make and model hindered numerous internal activities. This information should be received early in the activation stages to allow sufficient time for preparation and planning.

(3) Equipment that was not received in CONUS must be requisitioned immediately upon arrival in-country. Recommend that the advance party establish accounts and submit necessary requisitions for TOE equipment, special tools, and shop stock.

s/Jon R. Telfer
t/JON R. TELFER
MAJ, TC
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"

for Mr. Telfer, CA-3, VJ
THOMAS P. AUTH
1LT, AGC
Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

| | | | |
|--|--|---|-----------------|
| 1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) | | 2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | |
| HQ, OACSFJR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 | | Unclassified | |
| 2b. GROUP | | | |
| 3. REPORT TITLE | | | |
| Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) | | | |
| 4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) | | | |
| Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68 | | | |
| 5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) | | | |
| CO, 765th Transportation Battalion (AM&S) (GS) | | | |
| 6. REPORT DATE | | 7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES | 7b. NO. OF REFS |
| 13 November 1968 | | 26 | |
| 8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. | | 8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| b. PROJECT NO. | | 684294 | |
| c. N/A | | 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) | |
| d. | | | |
| 10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT | | | |
| | | | |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY | |
| N/A | | OACSFJR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 | |
| 13. ABSTRACT | | | |
| | | | |